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Charles Taylor, Mikhail Epstein and ‘Minimal Religion’ 
 
Abstract In A Secular Age Charles Taylor endorses Mikhail Epstein’s notion of 
‘minimal religion’ as his preferred orientation to the good for Western secular 
society. This article examines the basis of Epstein’s ‘minimal religion’ which 
rests on the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung. It is 
shown that Freud’s theories are incompatible with Taylor’s own thought, and 
in the case of Jung, Epstein fails to develop the latter’s contribution to our 
understanding of religion. Moreover, although Taylor endorses Epstein’s 
work he makes no reference to Jung. To this end, the importance of Jung’s 
theories in relation to religion are elucidated and offered as a way to forge a 
dialogue between a nuanced humanist position and the theistic vision offered 
by Taylor. 
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Charles Taylor, Mikhail Epstein and ‘Minimal Religion’ 
 
Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age (2007) is a monumental attempt to map out the 
rise of secularism in the West over the past 500 years. One interesting aspect 
of the book is that Taylor reminds us of the religious origins and aspects of a 
range of issues that may still be grasped by humanists as ‘spiritual’ today. He 
draws attention to the commonalties and points of difference between 
humanist and religious perspectives, and does so from a theistic position. 
Towards the end of the book he considers this issue further by engaging in 
speculation on what the future may hold in a secular world for religious belief 
(Taylor, 2007, 767-768). He contends that there are two possible alternative 
futures that stand before us, both of which ‘depend on two fundamental 
assumptions about the place of the spiritual in human life’ (Taylor, 2007, 768). 
One future is the further development of secularism that sees religion 
receding in influence and importance. The fundamental assumption for this 
vision is that ‘religious transcendent views are erroneous’ or implausible 
(Taylor, 2007, 768). The other future, and Taylor’s preferred option, is based 
on a different assumption, which maintains that ‘in our religious lives we are 
responding to a transcendent reality’ through our search for ‘fullness’ (Taylor, 
2007, 768). Taylor freely admits that we do not know which of these 
competing futures will prevail, but mentions that the ‘intimations’ in the work 
of the cultural theorist Mikhail Epstein ‘may turn out to be prescient’(Taylor, 
2007, 770), especially through his notion of ‘minimal religion’ (Taylor, 2007, 
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533). However, commentators on Taylor’s speculations have been silent on his 
endorsement of Epstein’s work on minimal religion (See for example, 
Sheehan, 2010, 232; Mahmood, 2009, 295-296 and Knight, 2009, 81). So what 
follows is a critical consideration of a missing dimension to our 
understanding of Taylor’s thought, and an attempt to deepen the dialogue on 
spiritual matters between theistic and humanist perspectives. This is not to 
deny that there must ultimately be a divide between humanist and theistic 
viewpoints, but it is an attempt to push to the edge of the boundaries of that 
divide in the search for fullness. Taylor can make the fair point that  for 
exclusive humanism the ‘door is barred against further discovery’, but it can 
also be proposed that perhaps a more open humanism, as I will portray here, 
may suggest that the door may not be barred at all (Taylor, 2007, 769).  
 
Through his discussion of fullness and spiritual conversions, Taylor raises 
important issues that rely on an understanding of human consciousness that 
is shown to be incompatible with Epstein’s account of how ‘minimal religion’ 
has and can emerge. For Epstein, the spiritual itinerary that comes from 
within originates from the theory of the unconscious in the work of Sigmund 
Freud. However, Taylor rules out this source because it remains tied to the 
immanent realm of an insulated self that does not attain true fullness. To 
expose this more clearly, I will outline Epstein’s positive reading of Freud and 
his inclusion of Jung whom Taylor does not mention or consider, and then 
contrast this with Taylor’s more qualified understanding of Freud’s position. 
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The contention is that Taylor’s desire to endorse Epstein’s vision for his 
alternative future must fail, given the importance Epstein attaches to using 
Freud’s theory of the unconscious. Epstein’s use of Freud is also shown to be 
problematic given Freud’s hostility to religion, and even though the more 
nuanced position of Jung is noted by Epstein it is only in a limited way. In 
contrast, I will develop Jung’s position much further to show that he can be 
an efficacious source for striking up a dialogue between a humanist 
perspective and Taylor’s theism and explore this through the examples of the 
conversion of St. Paul and the atheism of Richard Dawkins.  
  
Taylor on Epstein 
 
Taylor’s discussion of Epstein occurs in two places in A Secular Age. Both 
concern Taylor’s thoughts on the role of religion in the present and in the 
future. The first is at the end of his chapter on ‘Religion Today’ just prior to 
part five on ‘Conditions of Belief’ (Taylor, 2007, 533-535).  The second is at the 
end of the book in the chapter on ‘Conversions’ (Taylor, 2007, 770 referring to 
Epstein, 1999a and 199b via Sutton, 2006). In the first discussion Taylor 
observes that Western modernity has seen an obvious decline in belief and 
practice, with the ‘unchallengeable status that belief enjoyed in earlier 
centuries’ now being ‘lost’ (Taylor, 2007, 530). However, he contends that due 
to this development we now live in a ‘pluralist world’ where both belief and 
unbelief ‘jostle, and hence fragilise each other’ (Taylor, 2007, 531).  
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It is in this context that he then introduces Mikhail Epstein to suggest that his 
descriptions of what have occurred in post-Soviet Russia could be a useful 
way to understand what is occurring in the West (Taylor, 2007, 533). 
Following Epstein, Taylor describes how ‘minimal religion’ is typified by 
immediacy in that it is a spirituality ‘lived out within family and friends 
rather than in churches’, and as such it is more concerned with actual human 
beings in the places that surround us. On this view, these people are looking 
for the image of God in those around them, in response to and a rejection of 
the Marxist communist desire for showing compassion for the ‘‘‘distant one’‘’, 
in Epstein’s words, to the detriment of feeling towards one’s neighbours 
(Taylor, 2007, 534, quoting Epstein, 1999a, 167-168). Moreover, as they have 
emerged from the atheist ‘”void”’ this means that they are involved in ‘”a 
striving for fullness of spirit, and transcending the boundaries of historical 
denominations”’ (Taylor, 2007, 534, quoting Epstein, 1999b, 386). Epstein sees 
this development as a new ‘”religious reformation [that] will dominate the 
spirit of twenty-first century Russia”’ (Taylor, 2007, 534, quoting Epstein, 
1999b, 386).  
 
Taylor detects a similar move in ‘post-secular’ Europe, that is, post-secular in 
the sense that the dominant secularisation thesis that religion is in major 
decline becomes challenged more and more (Taylor, 2007, 534). Indeed, as 
such dominance has aided the decline, its overcoming offers new possibilities 
(Taylor, 2007, 535). ‘Minimal religion’ in the West takes the form of being 
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spiritual but not religious in that the spiritual life remains at a distance from 
the ‘disciplines and authority of religious confessions’. The distance is due to 
the weariness of the claims to religious authority and confessional leadership, 
whereas in Russia it was in response to the ‘”wasteland”’ left by militant 
atheism, and the unavailability of confessions (Taylor, 2007, 535, quoting 
Epstein, 1999b, 386). 
 
At the end of A Secular Age, Taylor admits that although he has resisted the 
temptation to lay out his own vision of the future, ultimately he cannot stop 
himself from speculating, and in doing so he again refers to Epstein (Taylor, 
2007, 767-768). He posits two alternative futures, one that is typified by 
modern secularisation theory, which sees religion on a downward spiral into 
a minority pastime (Taylor, 2007, 768). Another possible future against this 
mainstream view is where we are responding to a transcendent reality in our 
religious lives. Taylor says we all have a sense of this because it emerges in 
our identifying, recognising and attempting to attain fullness. For example, 
those who remain within the immanent frame such as exclusive humanists 
are responding to a transcendent reality but they are ‘misrecognising’ it and 
ignoring its crucial features. Taylor recognises that this attempt to shut out 
features of the transcendent is understandable, because breaking out would 
remind us how much we have always shut out in the first place (Taylor, 2007, 
769). Nevertheless, break out we must if we are to achieve true fullness in 
Taylor’s terms.  
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So what of Taylor’s future then? He argues that its general structure would be 
typified by two opposing positions (Taylor, 2007, 770). On one side will be 
those who want to move inward to a more immanent position and on the 
other side will be those who find this general equilibrium stifling and will 
want to move outward. Taylor argues that in those societies where the 
general equilibrium point is strongly within immanence and where people 
would not be able to comprehend how a sane person could believe in God, 
the main secularisation thesis that blames religion for all the ills in the world 
will become less plausible over time. People will realise that other societies 
are not following this path, that this master narrative is not about universal 
humanity, and that many of the ills that religion was apparently responsible 
for will not disappear. He recognises that there might be an attempt to 
stigmatise these other societies as being hostile to Western values, as is now 
done by many Europeans in relation to the United States and Islam, but he 
thinks that this way of lending plausibility to the secularisation thesis will 
wane eventually. Within the dominance of this immanent equilibrium, Taylor 
suggests that subsequent generations will feel as though they are living in a 
‘‘‘waste land’‘’, and that ‘many young people will again begin to explore 
beyond the boundaries’. He does not predict how this might happen, but he 
does give the example of Mikhail Epstein’s analysis of religion in post-Soviet 
Russia that we have just outlined and whose ‘intimations’, Taylor suggests, 
‘may turn out to be prescient’ (Taylor, 2007, 770).  
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So Epstein’s notion of minimal religion in a post-atheist world assumes an 
important part of Taylor’s understanding of the current predicament of belief 
and unbelief in the West, and a pointer to a possible alternative future. 
However, Taylor does not inform us on what basis Epstein makes his 
argument, but it is far more than simply saying it was due to the collapse of 
Soviet Communism. As we shall now see, Epstein roots his account in a 
psychological understanding of the self through his notion of a ‘religious 
unconscious’ by utilising the theories of Freud and Jung. Taylor does not 
mention this in his account of Epstein, and he also does not mention that 
Epstein sees these psychological transformations of the religious self as 
occurring through conversions. In fact it is not just that Taylor forgets to 
mention the role of conversions in this process for Epstein, he actually cuts it 
out of the long quotation he uses. This does seem odd given that Taylor 
himself puts a great emphasis on conversions, but as we shall see, the 
omission becomes understandable once we realise how Taylor views Freud, 
although it is difficult to understand why he offers no mention of Jung. To 
grasp this means elucidating the role of consciousness in relation to 
conversions for both Epstein and Taylor. 
 
Epstein: Consciousness and Conversions 
 
In explaining the basis to his notion of ‘minimal religion’, Epstein uses the 
term ‘religious unconscious’ to refer to the ‘state of Russian spirituality in the 
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Soviet epoch and in particular to its latest phases when the official atheism is 
succeeded by various forms of post-atheist mentality’ (Epstein, 1999b, 345). 
He draws on Freud’s discussion of religious feeling in the latter’s 1929 text, 
Civilisation and its Discontents, in which Freud ‘establishes a close connection 
between religious feeling and the unconscious’ (Epstein, 1999b, 346; Freud, 
2001a). Freud is discussing a letter from his friend, Romain Rolland, who in 
response to reading Freud’s The Future of an Illusion (Freud, 2001b) 
encapsulates this relationship through his notion of ‘”oceanic feeling”’, which 
is ‘”something limitless, unbounded”’ and a ‘’purely subjective fact, not an 
article of faith’’ (Epstein, 1999b, 346; Freud, 2001a, 64). Rolland, who is 
paraphrased by Freud, sees this feeling as a ‘”source of religious energy”’ 
even though it does not offer a ‘”personal immortality”’, and it is therefore 
possible to ‘”call oneself religious on the ground of this oceanic feeling alone, 
even if one rejects every belief and every illusion”’ (Epstein, 1999b, 346; 
Freud, 2001a, 64). Rolland posits that this feeling is seized on by different 
‘”Churches and religious systems”’ and then ‘”directed by them into 
particular channels, and doubtless also exhausted by them”’ (Epstein, 1999b, 
346; Freud, 2001a, 64). Rolland then maintains that one can ‘”rightly call 
oneself religious on the ground of this oceanic feeling alone, even if one 
rejects every belief and illusion”’ (Epstein, 1999b, 346; Freud, 2001a, 64). 
Epstein notes how Freud then elucidates this oceanic feeling by contending 
that the conscious Ego and the unconscious Id penetrate each other, where the 
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Ego is, in Epstein’s words a ‘façade of the unconscious’, like an island 
surrounded by an ocean (Epstein, 1999b, 346).  
 
What Epstein fails to mention here is that Freud quickly rejects these 
arguments that he is reporting from Rolland. Freud admits that although he 
cannot find such a feeling in himself, he does not deny that it can occur in 
other people (Freud, 2001a, 65). However, the crucial point for him is whether 
it is being interpreted correctly and whether it is the source and origin of the 
whole need for religion. He argues that he can trace such a feeling back to an 
‘early phase of ego-feeling’ but the question then is whether this feeling can 
be seen as the source of religious needs (Freud, 2001a, 72). Freud thinks not, 
and instead derives religious need from the ‘infant’s helplessness and the 
longing for the father aroused by it’ as a form of protection. He contends that 
the oceanic feeling became connected with religion later on, and that being at 
one with the universe sounds like a ‘first attempt at religious consolation’ 
where the ego is protecting itself from the harsh realities of the real world. As 
such, religion is a form of infantilism, a neurosis, in which God as an object of 
worship is like an ‘exalted father’ who watches over his subjects and will 
compensate them in an afterlife for their sufferings on earth (Palmer, 1999, 
37). Epstein’s use of such a theory of the unconscious as a model for a 
‘religious unconscious’ as the basis of ‘minimal religion’ seems, therefore, 
somewhat suspect.  
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Epstein is on firmer ground when he then compares the ego as an island 
imagery to that found in the work of Carl Jung in his discussion of 
psychology and religion. Epstein notes how Jung sees the psyche as going so 
far beyond the limits of consciousness that consciousness itself can be seen as 
an ‘”island in the ocean”’ (Epstein, 1999b, 346; Jung, 1958, 84). Consciousness, 
as an imagined island is for Jung ‘”small and narrow”’ whereas the psyche as 
the ocean is ‘”immensely wide and deep and contains a life infinitely 
surpassing, in kind and degree, anything known on the island’” (Epstein, 
1999b, 346; Jung, 1958, 84). Epstein takes this metaphor to show how the 
‘atheization’ of Russian society in the Soviet era was similar to the sinking of 
the ancient island of Atlantis. Various forms of religiosity were banned rather 
than destroyed, plunged into the inner recesses of the unconscious, and 
downgraded to ‘the bottom of that ocean from which they were once raised 
by the consciousness of many generations of religious believers’ (Epstein, 
1999b, 346-347). Epstein states that he understands the notion of the 
unconscious as a ‘general cultural paradigm’ that operates on many different 
levels from the psychological, the historical, social, aesthetic and theological 
(Epstein, 1999b, 347). The unconscious, residing in either the psychic, the 
social or cultural life of the human subject, therefore lies beyond the 
boundaries of consciousness and exists as a conflicting ‘other’. So Epstein is 
rooting his understanding of ‘minimal religion’ in the theories of Freud and 
Jung and the notion of a religious unconscious acting as an ‘other’ on an 
individual’s path to ‘fullness’ (Epstein, 1999b, 386). 
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Epstein then considers the role of conversions in this process and he identifies 
two different ways this can occur. One way is a conversion to God through 
‘the church’, which he depicts as the normal understating of the experience as 
it has occurred throughout the world with the established religions. The other 
way is a conversion to ‘the church’ through God as happened in the times of  
Moses, Christ and Luther, and he considers this form to be the way 
conversions occur in late-atheist and post-atheist Russia. So for Epstein, the 
personal experience through the engagement with an ‘other’ in terms of the 
emanation of a religious consciousness from the unconscious is how he 
grounds this experience of a conversion.  
  
However, there are weaknesses with Epstein’s attempt to elide Freud and 
Jung, especially given their dispute with each other, which has been described 
as ‘one of the most significant moments in the history of psychoanalysis’ 
(Palmer, 1999, 89). Epstein ignores the major differences between them in 
relation to both the unconscious and their understanding of religion. The 
fundamental disagreement stemmed from Freud’s ‘positivistic and 
deterministic approach’, manifest in his biological preoccupation with the 
sexual origin of neurosis, which offers a ‘reductive account of mental 
phenomena like religious belief’ (Palmer, 1999, 91). In contrast, Jung is far 
more open and less reductive as he contends that there is more to the world 
than can be accounted for by scientific materialism. For Jung, psychic reality is 
unique and not a secondary product (Palmer, 1999, 91-92). Consequently, 
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ancient ideas, such as the idea of God, contain an aspect of psychological 
truth as an empirically evident psychic reality. Religion, as part of this psychic 
reality, should therefore not be treated as abnormal because reducible to a 
father complex (Palmer, 1999, 92). Freud and Jung both believed in the 
capacity of humans to heal themselves through the discovery of their 
unconscious but for Freud this could only be achieved by eliminating the 
religious neurosis. In contrast, for Jung, this process involves a reorientation 
of consciousness towards psychic processes such as religion, given they are 
deep expressions of the innermost workings of the mind. For Freud, the 
presence of religion is a symptom of neurosis, but for Jung it is religion’s 
absence that is indicative of a neurosis. Such a difference between them had 
profound implications over what they saw as psychological data and how it 
was to be assessed, and what constitutes the therapeutic ideal and how it can 
be achieved. This led to the development of Jung’s thinking on religion and 
his movement away from Freud’s theories. I will explore the efficacious 
nature of Jung’s understanding of religion in relation to Taylor’s theistic 
orientation to the good later. What is important now is that Taylor’s 
endorsement of Epstein’s ‘minimal religion’ is undermined because as we 
shall now see, Taylor ultimately rejects Freud’s theory of the self and 
unconscious for his own religious vision, and he does not discuss or utilise 
the more amenable theories of Jung.  
 
Taylor: Consciousness and Conversions  
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Taylor considers the relation of belief and unbelief not as rival theories, but as 
different types of lived experience in the way we understand our lives, both 
morally and spiritually, in our pursuit of what he calls ‘fullness’ (Taylor, 2007, 
4-5 & 780n.8). Despite its admittedly terminological difficulties, Taylor 
explains the notion of fullness as existing in an activity or condition where life 
is ‘fuller, richer, deeper, more worthwhile, more admirable, more what it 
should be’, which we can aspire to or achieve ourselves (Taylor, 2007, 5). 
Taylor relates an illustrative example from the autobiography of Bede 
Griffiths, the British-born Benedictine monk who, on the last term at school, 
walks into the evening and hears the birds singing in a way never 
experienced before leading him to surmise eventually that he was coming into 
contact with God. Taylor notes how the fullness here emerges from an 
experience which disturbs our everyday sense of being in the world and 
allows the ‘other’ to shine through by overcoming negativity and pursuing 
our fullest aspirations through Schiller’s notion of ‘”play”’ (Taylor, 2007, 5-6; 
Schiller, 1967, Ch. 15). For Taylor, such experiences allow us to posit a place of 
fullness to which we orient ourselves both spiritually and morally, and they 
bring us into the presence of God, or the voice of nature or the ‘alignment in 
us of desire and the drive to form’ (Taylor, 2007, 6). We may not be clear 
where they have come from and may face difficulties in trying to articulate 
such experiences, but if we can, then we feel a sense of release when we do so, 
 15 
which itself intensifies the experience even more, giving a sense of meaning 
and purpose to our lives.  
 
Taylor considers further those who have broken out of the immanent frame 
and have gone though some kind of conversion (Taylor, 2007, 728). He also 
notes that most people who have a conversion may not have experienced this 
type of epiphany and may instead take on an understanding of religion from 
others such as saints, prophets or charismatic leaders ‘who have radiated 
some sense of more direct contact’ (Taylor, 2007, 729). He lists St Francis of 
Assisi, Saint Theresa, Jonathan Edwards or John Wesley  as paradigms in this 
regard for allowing ordinary people to have confidence in a shared religious 
language or a way of articulating fullness. Alternatively, they may even be 
unknown as saints to ordinary people, but in either case, and sometimes these 
are intertwined, such a shared language gives a meaning to ‘what it means to 
belong to a church’ by realising that others have lived this fullness ‘in a more 
complete and direct and powerful manner’. 
 
Taylor then argues for an expansion in the scope of examples involved in this 
direct contact because the examples of Bede and even the more powerful 
mysticism of Theresa are a confinement on the closeness to the place of 
fullness. The important form of contact in the Christian tradition, Taylor 
informs us, is not simply the vision of God’s power out there as in the 
epiphany of Bede, but in a ‘heightened power of love’ that God opens up in 
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people, not subjectively in terms of personal power, ‘but as a participation in 
God’s love’. St Francis is the paradigm for this more direct form of contact. 
Consequently, points of contact with fullness need to be widened to stop us 
from seeing such experience simply subjectively or as part of our feelings, and 
so separated from the object experienced, which is typified in the case of Bede 
(Taylor, 2007, 729-730). However, in the case of St Francis there is a more life-
changing moment where he is ‘”surprised by love”’, even though the same 
event could provoke both responses (Taylor, 2007, 730). Taylor contends that 
such a range is not exhaustive and whereas the latter involves individuals, 
there is also a collective transformation that has been noted by Durkheim, and 
which has declined somewhat since the dawn of religion, but takes place 
through a festive ritual or celebration which brings people together and opens 
them to fullness. In contemporary society many conversions or what he also 
calls ‘founding moves of a new spiritual direction in history’, involve a 
paradigm change similar to that in science, which alters the frame within 
which people think and even takes them beyond such a frame (Taylor, 2007, 
730-731). In the past, examples of this are encapsulated in figures such as 
Jesus who changed the notion of the Messiah in his time, the Buddha who 
altered the perception of what it meant to go beyond the chain of rebirth, and 
in the case of St Francis there was a transformation of what it meant to 
respond to God’s love (Taylor, 2007, 731). So conversions are an important 
moment on the path to fullness. They are experienced subjectively but they 
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must relate to an external object, which for Taylor is God. On that basis, how 
does Taylor consider the role of Freud’s theories in this process? 
 
In his discussion of fullness, Taylor includes Freud as part of the naturalist 
tradition that understands humans as being driven on one side by instinct 
and on the other side by the need for survival. As part of this movement, 
Freud understands fullness as being approximated through the ‘power of 
reason’ that is ours alone, and which we develop through our own ‘heroic’ 
actions (Taylor, 2007, 9). Taylor sees this form of fullness as ‘rejoicing’ in one 
of the ‘modes of self-sufficient reason’ within the realm of unbelief. Here, 
there is an ‘admiration for the power of cool, disengaged reason, capable of 
contemplating the world and human life without illusion, and of acting 
lucidly for the best in the interest of human flourishing’. Reason is respected 
with a degree of ‘awe’ due to its critical acumen that allows us to break free 
from the ‘illusion and blind forces of instinct, as well as the phantasies bred of 
our fear and narrowness and pusillanimity’. Within this Freudian view of 
fullness humans recognise themselves as both frail and brave as they face the 
challenge of a meaningless universe and attempt to devise their own rules of 
life to combat it. Taylor contends that this gives us a great degree of 
empowerment, and a sense of our own greatness as we aspire to this 
condition of fullness, albeit, he suggests, if we ‘only rarely, if ever, achieve’ it.  
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Freud is endorsing what Taylor calls the ‘buffered self’ that engages in a 
‘disengaged’, ‘disciplined stance to self and society’, and is a defining 
characteristic of modern identity (Taylor, 2007, 136-137). The ‘buffered self’ 
also suffers ‘disenchantment’ and brings ‘an end to porousness in relation to 
the world of spirits’ (Taylor, 2007, 137). In its place is a ‘new experience of the 
self as having a telos of autarky’, and Taylor posits ‘Freud’s sense of the 
proud loneliness of the ego’ as an example of this, where humans focus their 
emotions within rather than without in relation to other people (Taylor, 2007, 
138). On that basis, Freud is also part of the tradition that developed from the 
nineteenth century and produced the very deep forms of unbelief that are 
prevalent today (Taylor, 2007, 369). Freud used science to make the break 
with religion through his ‘depth psychology’, which exposed an uncovering 
reality beneath the surface of appearances (Taylor, 2007, 501 & 369). Taylor 
maintains that we are still living with the fallout from this shift to depth, 
whether we believe in these theories or not.  
 
Taylor then considers how the disenchanted world of the ‘buffered self’ needs 
a theory to account for events such as rock concerts or raves that give us 
common feelings that take us out of the everyday (Taylor, 2007, 518). He asks 
how we can explain such an experience and he recognises that Freud’s theory 
offers one possibility. However, Taylor maintains that the participants in 
these activities are actually far removed from these disengaged subjects that 
he sees as typical of the ‘immanent, naturalistic world-view’ that Freud’s 
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theories are part of. Taylor sees these festivities as allowing a transcendent 
moment to erupt in our lives, no matter how ‘well we have organised them 
around immanent understandings of order’. He suggests that such moments 
can offer us a ‘strong feeling of spiritual affinity’ or ‘blinding insight’ that can 
continue through some ‘demanding spiritual discipline’, and that may then 
lead into meditation, prayer and a religious life. ‘Arguably’, Taylor proposes, 
this development is becoming ‘more prominent and widespread’ in our age, 
because people are becoming less satisfied with a ‘momentary sense of wow!’ 
So a move from a Freudian therapeutic to a spiritual perspective is possible, 
but Taylor concludes that as the psychical account of a person’s desires and 
fears becomes disrupted, the more potent path to fullness instead charts a 
path to something transcendent. 
 
Similarly, in his discussion of the inter-war years of the twentieth century, 
Taylor detects a further retreat from belief through the ‘subtler languages of 
Continental Modernism’ of which Freud plays a prominent part (Taylor, 2007, 
409). Taylor depicts Freud as being an important figure in one of the ‘‘‘master 
narratives’‘’ that forged the rise of modern secularity and courageously 
resisted the ‘blandishments of comforting meaning’ (Taylor, 2007, 573 & 596). 
As such, this standpoint is ‘ethically driven’ and supported by the ethical 
‘aura surrounding engagement’. Consequently, Taylor states that he takes it 
as given that all philosophical positions accept some definition of human 
greatness and fullness in human life, and so concedes that materialists do not 
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deny ethics as some critics contend (Taylor, 2007, 597). However, he contends 
that the materialist position offers an inferior understanding of fullness 
because, along with all those positions that remain within the realm of 
immanence, they account for the ‘specific force of creative agency, or ethical 
demands, or for the power of artistic experience’ without recourse to ‘some 
transcendent being’. What distinguishes the believer from the unbeliever is 
the believer’s adherence to, and personal relation with, a loving God, which 
manifests itself in devotion, prayer and giving (Taylor, 2007, 8). However, this 
is a form of empowerment that still has to be further ‘opened, transformed, 
brought out of self’. Analogous to this largely Christian account, Taylor 
momentarily considers Buddhism, which although rejecting the personal as 
being central, is still concerned with ‘transcending the self’ and ‘receiving a 
power that goes beyond us’. In contrast, unbelievers are trying to attain 
fullness from within, rather than from without, and this can take many 
different forms of which Freud is one. For Taylor, then, without 
transcendence there cannot be fullness and as Freud remains within a ‘purely 
immanent outlook’ he cannot serve as a basis for Taylor’s psychological 
account of religious experience. His endorsement of Epstein’s ‘minimal 
religion’ is therefore severely undermined (Taylor, 2007, 360 & 400). 
 
In contrast to Freud, Taylor draws on the ‘very suggestive’ work of Marcel 
Gauchet, who shows how this understanding of the unconscious within us 
has ‘multiple sources’ (Taylor, 2007, 348; Gauchet, 1992). These emanate from 
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a Romanticism that acknowledges our ‘unsaid depths’ along with the ‘idea of 
the continuity of all living forms’, which also builds on the notion of a 
‘‘‘cerebral unconscious’‘’ that develops in the nineteenth century and sees our 
highest functions of thinking and willing as the ‘product of neuro-
physiological functions’ such as the ‘reflex arc and sensori-motor scheme’ 
(Taylor, 2007, 348-349). So a ‘psycho-physiological outlook’ that puts 
‘consciousness, thinking and will within its bodily realisation’ becomes 
predominant from the mid-nineteenth century (Taylor, 2007, 349).  
 
Taylor then mentions his own preferred position, which is to understand 
these meanings theistically in an ‘orthodox Christian frame’ (Taylor, 2007, 
351). However, he maintains that the ‘modern cosmic imaginary’ is important 
not for fostering any one position, but for creating a ‘space in which people 
can wander between and around all these options without having to land 
clearly and definitively in any one’. In the war between belief and unbelief a 
no-man’s-land is therefore created that is neutral and a place where people 
can escape the war altogether. Taylor suggests this is one reason why the war 
is dissipating in modernity despite the efforts of radical minorities. 
 
Taylor does not expand further on how this theistic experience operates in the 
move from immanence to transcendence and thereby a response to God’s 
calling. Nor does he show how Gauchet’s theories would help us in doing so. 
Incidentally, it has also been suggested that Gauchet is not a viable source for 
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Taylor because Gauchet is suspicious of reducing the experience of an ‘other’ 
to a religious experience (Smith, 2009, 20; Gauchet, 2002, 17). However, as we 
have just seen, Taylor is not denying a non-religious experience here, but is 
instead saying that his own preferred way to understand such an experience 
on our psyche is in religious terms (See Taylor, 2009, 93). Gauchet is therefore 
valuable for Taylor by showing us that there are these multiple sources for 
experiences through the notion of the unconscious. It is just that Taylor fails to 
expand on the ways in which this can be achieved in his own religious 
framework in A Secular Age.  
 
Three years later, in an explanation of what Taylor was trying to do in A 
Secular Age in response to some critical essays, he was most concerned not 
about putting forward an opinion but in creating a conversation (Taylor, 2010, 
318). In terms of trying to speak out to everybody wherever they are, in 
Russia, Europe or the United States with different religious and non- religious 
traditions, Taylor says that he wants to cross all the divides. He wants a ‘host 
of different positions, religious, nonreligious, antireligious, humanistic, 
antihumanistic, and so on, in which we eschew mutual caricature and try to 
understand what “fullness” means for the other’. What annoys Taylor are the 
‘conversation-stoppers’ who have a tendency to ‘project evil’ onto other 
positions in order to have them eliminated resulting in the barbarisms in the  
name of religious faith throughout the world with no basis for dialogue 
(Taylor, 2010, 318-9).  
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To overcome this, Taylor begins to outline his own Catholicism as follows 
(Taylor, 2010, 319). First, he argues that the starting point is to have a ‘calling 
to understand very different positions, particularly very different 
understandings of fullness’. He observes that not doing so means considering 
your own position is right by caricaturing the alternative and rejecting it. For 
Taylor, this is only hobbling around on crutches. Instead, he proclaims that 
we need to ‘experience the power and attraction of quite different 
understandings of the world, atheist and theist’. As such, you must not live 
by what is ‘powerful in your own faith unless you throw away the crutches 
that keep you from facing that, and the crutches are depreciating stories about 
others’.  
 
The second reason is that you can learn things from these other positions but 
the third , and most ‘decisive’ for Taylor, is that it allows friendship to be built 
‘across these boundaries based on a real mutual sense, a powerful sense, of 
what moves the other person’. Such relationships are ‘agonistic’ in the sense 
that they are not about compromise or synthesis but rather to ‘incorporate the 
kind of understanding where each can come to be moved by what moves the 
other’ (Taylor, 2010, 320). Taylor then relates this to Christianity, and suggests 
that it is all to do with ‘reconciliation between human beings’ in general and 
not simply by ‘being within the Church’. This is why Taylor can say that he is 
a hopeless German romantic of the 1790s who, along with Herder, sees 
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‘humanity as the orchestra, in which all the differences between human 
beings could ultimately sound together in harmony’.     
 
Taylor himself is motivated by his faith and is ‘offering reasons for a certain 
kind of Christian position’. His starting point is to get a ‘conversation going 
across as many differences as he can’ even though he recognises that his 
sympathies are narrow and he does not go as broad as he should. He is 
therefore critical of other ways of being a Catholic and other forms of 
Catholicism that ‘come from relatively high places’. Overall, his main aim in 
the book is to explain modern secularity and the various positions within it 
that allows us to have a conversation that ‘bridges these differences’.  
 
Taylor also notes a practical side to this as part of his work on the Quebec 
commission on the practices of reasonable accommodation, which considered 
issues of religious difference, especially in relation to Islam and Islamaphobia. 
Taylor explains how the meetings were organised not with major dignitaries 
or people from relevant organisations but with ordinary people coming in off 
the street to air their views (Taylor, 2010, 320-1). Some opinions were 
xenophobic but these were challenged by others present and undermined the 
caricatures that were being expressed causing people to change their 
viewpoint.  
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On that basis, Taylor argues that this ‘gut sense’ that there is something really 
valuable in another person or view that should be engaged with is just as 
important as having rules and principles to ensure that diversity can produce 
a decent society (Taylor, 2010, 321). Taylor thinks this is essential when things 
become difficult and especially when the media behaves irresponsibly by 
creating scare stories to manipulate public opinion. In this way, the ‘small 
battalions really count’ in opening ourselves to the views of the other and so 
‘stand like firebreaks in a forest fire’. For Taylor, the commission was trying to 
increase these firebreaks and such a political action complemented the 
conversations he was trying to create in A Secular Age. He concludes that this 
is the ‘kind of thing we have to be doing’ now and in the future.  
 
Previously, Taylor has not always been as open as this in the acceptance of 
non-theistic views (See Taylor, 1999 and my critique in Fraser 2007, Ch. 2) and 
his admission of narrowness in his own Catholicism above seems to recognise 
this.  What I now want to suggest is that the theories of Carl Jung can be a 
fertile source for opening up a dialogue between a nuanced humanism and 
Taylor’s own theism around the issue of fullness.  
 
As was shown earlier, Jung rejects Freud’s theory of religion and I now want 
to use Jung’s theories to flesh out the religious experience that Taylor has 
been describing. In this way, I will be trying to create a dialogue between a 
humanist position and Taylor’s articulation of his religious vision. The 
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justification for doing so arises from Taylor’s endorsement of Epstein, who 
does use classical psychoanalytical theory, but in a way that does scant justice 
to Jung.  
 
As we have seen, Taylor states that he understands the complex processes of 
what constitutes consciousness and the unconscious through his own 
preferred framework of theism. Part of this process of a change in 
consciousness is achieved through a conversion where an individual is put 
into contact with God. The mechanisms for achieving this, what is actually 
involved, are not explained or explored by Taylor, and this leaves a gap in his 
account of fullness and thereby his own vision of the good. To that end, I will 
explore Jung’s theories on religion in an attempt to open the door that Taylor 
assumes is shut, between the nuanced humanism of Jung and his own theism.  
 
Jung on Religion 
 
Jung understands the psyche as having three different but interacting 
dimensions: consciousness, the personal unconscious and the collective 
unconscious (Jung, 1998, 67; Cf. Palmer, 99-100). The function of 
consciousness is to ‘recognise and assimilate the external world’ through the 
senses and ‘to translate into visible reality the world within us’ (Jung, 1969, 
158). The personal unconscious relates to the individual and houses moments 
of psychic material that have not reached the level of consciousness because 
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they were not intense enough experiences to do so, and either became 
forgotten or have been repressed (Jung, 1998, 67). The collective unconscious 
is common to all people and perhaps even all animals. Jung sees it as the ‘true 
basis of the individual psyche’ and as an ‘ancestral heritage of possibilities of 
representation’. The collective unconscious therefore contains primordial 
images that reside in all people across all generations, and can come to 
consciousness under certain conditions (Jung, 1998, 69). Jung states that these 
images are the ‘deposits of the constantly repeated experiences of humanity’ 
and contain fantasies, dreams, myths and religious thought (Jung, 1998, 69-
70). He refers to them as ‘archetypes’ or ‘recurrent impressions made by 
subjective reactions’ that produce a ‘numinous or a fascinating effect, or 
impels to action’ (Jung, 1998, 71). The ‘numinous’ nature of this religious 
experience, what Jung refers to as the ‘numinosum’, refers to a ‘dynamic 
agency or effect’ that ‘seizes and controls the human subject, who is always 
rather its victim than its creator’ and is independent of a person’s will (Jung, 
1958, 7). Such an experience is therefore external to the individual and 
belongs to a ‘visible object or the influence of an invisible presence that causes 
a peculiar alteration of consciousness’. Religion itself, then, ‘designates the 
attitude peculiar to a consciousness which has been changed by experience of 
the “numinosum”’ and Jung cites the conversion of Paul as a ‘striking example’ 
of this (Jung, 1958, 8), which I will explore in more detail later.  
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In a discussion of a psychological approach to the trinity, Jung considers this 
further and notes how such transformations are not everyday occurrences, 
given they ‘usually have a numinous character’ and ‘can take the form of 
conversions’ (Jung, 1958, 183). He characterises these transformations as: 
‘illuminations, emotional shocks, blows of fate, religious or mystical 
experiences, or their equivalents’ (Jung, 1958, 183-184). Jung then bemoans 
how modern people have such ‘hopelessly muddled ideas about anything 
‘”mystical’’’ or they fear it, so that they are bound to ‘misunderstand its true 
character and will deny or repress its numinosity’ (Jung, 1958, 184). It will 
then wrongly be seen as ‘inexplicable, irrational and even pathological’, but 
this misinterpretation is due to a lack of insight and a poor understanding of 
the complex relationships operating in the background. These relationships 
can only be clarified by supplementing the conscious data with material from 
the unconscious, and in this way the gaps in a person’s experience of life can 
be filled in and understood. Jung maintains that the numinous character of 
these experiences is evinced by their overwhelming nature, which goes 
against both our pride and our deep-rooted fear, given pride is a reaction to 
covering up a secret fear, that consciousness is losing its ascendancy to the 
unconscious. For Jung then, we should allow ourselves to be open to this 
transcendent moment and overcome our fear, and this strikes a strong 
resonance with Taylor’s edict that we should stop shutting out these 
experiences. Moreover, Jung’s more elucidatory account of this religious 
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understanding of these experiences through the psyche opens up the door to 
a dialogue with Taylor’s theistic assertions from a nuanced humanist position.  
 
It is therefore also interesting to also compare Jung’s own speculations on the 
future when he was writing in the late 1950s a few years before his death in 
1961. He declared then that he was neither ‘spurred on by excessive optimism 
nor in love with high ideals’, but was instead ‘concerned with the fate of the 
individual human being’ (Jung, 1998, 403). He reflected that there appeared to 
be a wide disposition to unbelief and this was forcing believers onto the 
defensive and to catechize themselves on the basis of their own religious 
convictions (Jung, 1998, 391). Jung notes how such a situation, combined with 
the ‘weakening of the Church and the precariousness of its dogmatic 
assumptions’, leads the latter to offer more faith as the antidote. However, 
Jung counters that the gift of grace does not depend on a person’s goodwill 
and pleasure through consciousness, but is instead based on ‘spontaneous 
religious experience, which brings the individual’s faith into immediate 
relation with God’. The question to answer for all of us, according to Jung, is 
whether as individuals we have any ‘religious experience and immediate 
relation to God, and hence that certainty’, which will preserve our 
individuality and stop us from ‘dissolving in the crowd’.  Jung infers that the 
religious person has a ‘great advantage’ in answering this question, because 
he or she understands how their subjective existence is ‘grounded’ in their 
relation to ‘”God”’ (Jung, 1998, 392). Jung explains that he puts the word God 
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in quotes to signify that he is dealing with an ‘anthropomorphic idea whose 
dynamism and symbolism are filtered through the medium of an unconscious 
psyche’. Jung contends that even unbelievers can get close to the source of 
this experience, but concludes that without this approach the ‘prototype’ of 
such an experience is the rare case of a ‘miraculous’ conversions as in Paul’s 
epiphany on the road to Damascus. Jung declares therefore that religious 
experience does not need any proof given the ‘subjectively overwhelming 
numinosity’ that accompanies it, but says it is a misfortune that it has 
occurred through religion and psychology given the prejudices against them 
(Jung, 1998, 392-393). This leads him to rhetorically ask whether people realise 
that they could be on the verge of losing the ‘life-preserving myth’ of the 
inner self that Christianity has conjured up for them, but rests his hope that 
they have not (Jung, 1998,  403). After all, the whole world depends on the 
‘infinitesimal unit’ of the human being, and ‘in whom, if we read the meaning 
of the Christian message aright, even God seeks his goal’. As Jung argues, the 
greatest limitation for all individuals is as a self that is ‘manifested in the 
experience: ‘”I am only that!”’ (Jung, 1995, 357). This has become widespread, 
according to Jung, due to the emphasis on the ‘here and now’ that has 
resulted in the ‘daimonisation’ of humans and their world’ where they have 
been ‘robbed of transcendence’ (Jung, 1995, 358). Instead, we need to search 
for meaning ‘both without and within’ (Jung, 1995, 349).  
 
The Conversion of St Paul 
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Taylor has stressed the importance of conversions for achieving fullness and 
what I want to argue here is that the theistic understanding Taylor gives to 
this experience can be shared with a non-theistic understanding via a Jungian 
framework. Taylor discusses St. Paul in a consideration of Erasmus’ 
exploration of the use of the sacrament (Taylor, 2007, 72). Taylor argues that 
Erasmus endorsed the use of the sacrament for good ends such as bringing us 
into contact with grace but maintained that this still ‘diverts us from true 
piety’. For Erasmus, Taylor contends, the goal of praying to saints should be 
our own spiritual development. He quotes Erasmus as stipulating that the 
“‘true way to worship saints is to imitate their virtues’” and they would 
appreciate this far more than lighting a myriad of candles. Veneration of the 
bones of Paul in a shrine, for example, is one thing, but you cannot venerate 
the mind of Paul that is enshrined in his works. Taylor states that the crucial 
point here is the ‘end we have in view’ rather than the practice to that end and 
adds that it is inevitable that following this end will result in the dissipation 
of many practices. Taylor argues that if the ‘aim is to become more inwardly 
like Paul‘, then touching a relic is not  the right course of action not because 
the relic did not make you spiritually better but because the relic  existed in a 
world where the boundaries between the spiritual and the material benefit 
‘went usually unremarked’.  
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Taylor also mentions St. Paul as part of a ‘powerful moral attraction of a new, 
less cluttered, more universal and fraternal space’ that has ‘wide resonances 
in human history’ (Taylor 2007, p. 576). Taylor lists as examples, the followers 
of the Buddha entering the ‘new space of the Sangha’ from the ‘caste dharma’; 
the followers of Christ based on the parable of the Good Samaritan, ‘until 
Paul can say: ‘“in Christ is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, man nor 
woman”’ and finally the ‘new space of Islam’ that was created by the 
followers of Muhammad’ that transcends ‘all tribes and nations’. For Taylor, 
the power that these types of events have for humankind could offer a more 
enlightened understanding of ourselves if only we could define it (Taylor, 
2007, 577). He admits that he cannot do that himself but contends that 
explaining this power in negative terms as a movement away from restraint is 
not a feasible one. Instead, we need to see this as a ‘steady sense of reaching 
something higher’ as a ‘positive attraction of the space we are released into’ 
such as the ‘search for Enlightenment, of salvation, or of submission to God, 
or the cosmopolis of Gods’. It is to this ‘something higher’ on the path to 
fullness that I suggest Jung can aid Taylor’s articulation of this process.  
 
As was mentioned above, for Jung, the conversion of Paul was a ‘striking 
example’ of how the experience of the numinosum causes a change in 
consciousness. As Jung argues, in Paul’s case he did not know the Lord and 
received his gospel through revelation rather than through the apostles (Jung, 
1958, 433). The conversion he experienced was therefore via the revelation of 
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the Holy Ghost who in its own activity dwells and works in human beings 
producing an alteration in consciousness, ‘revelatory ecstasies’, and by 
reminding people of Christ’s teaching leads them into the light.  
 
The effects of the Holy Ghost both confirm the things we all know while 
transcending them (Jung, 1958, 433-4). Indeed, Jung detects that in Christ’s 
sayings there are already indications of ideas that go beyond traditional 
Christian morality as is evinced in the parable of the unjust steward which 
‘betrays an ethical standard very different from what is expected’ (Jung, 1958, 
434).  For Jung, the ‘moral criterion here is consciousness, and not law or 
convention’. Paul had the capacity for self-reflection when confronted with 
this experience, (Jung, 1958, 435) and such a religious transformation along 
with the development of a new state of consciousness, as Jung indicates, is 
encapsulated in Paul’s declaration in Galatians 2:20, where he pronounces 
that ‘“it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me”’ (Jung, 1958, 546 
& 546n.28).  
 
This turning inward means that St. Paul, or anyone who has experienced a 
conversion in this way, begins to feel the inner workings and words of God in 
their heart (Jung, 1958, 545-6). Jung describes this as a ‘new state of 
consciousness born of religious practice’ that is ‘empty’ and open to ‘another 
influence’, a ‘non-ego’ which takes over the ego in a  process of ‘religious 
transformation’ and often with the occurrence of ‘violent psychic convulsions’ 
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(Jung, 1958, 546). This experience is not simply replacing one way of seeing 
with another, ‘it is not that something different is seen, but that one sees differently’, 
and this depends on the development of the personality and ‘nature of the 
perceiving subject’ in a ‘process of religious transformation’ (Jung, 1958, 546-
7). For St. Paul, this was part of his ‘split consciousness’ which housed ‘the 
apostle directly called and enlightened by God’ but also the ‘sinful man who 
could not pluck out the “thorn in the flesh” and rid himself of the satanic 
angel who plagued him’ (Jung, 1958, 470). So even the ‘enlightened 
person…is never more than his own limited ego before the One who dwells 
within’ and is as ‘fathomless as the abysms of the earth and vast as the sky’.  
  
This psychoanalytical understanding of the conversion of St. Paul on the path 
to fullness is a useful way to help Taylor articulate this experience. It operates 
on the terrain of his own theism while still opening the door that Taylor 
presumes is shut to a more enlightened rather than exclusive humanism. As 
Jung indicates, the basis of Paul’s conversion was even more remarkable 
because it was not through love or faith but through hatred of the Christians 
which is why he set off on his trip to Damascus (Jung, 1958, 332). This 
shutting out and barring of the door is what Taylor repudiates in much of 
modern unbelief as represented by the aptly termed ‘aggressive atheism’ 
(Wilde, 2010) of Richard Dawkins that I examine next in an attempt to create a 
conversation across the atheist/theist divide.  
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Dawkins  
 
Interestingly, Dawkins uses Jung in his seven-scale classification of the 
probabilistic belief in the existence of God (Dawkins, 2006, 51). 1 indicates a 
‘strong theist’, a ‘100 per cent probability of God’ and, in the unreferenced 
words of Jung, the edict that: ‘“I do not believe, I know”’. 7 is typified as a 
‘strong atheist’ where someone knows there is no God with the ‘same 
conviction that Jung “knows” there is one’. Dawkins puts himself in 6, which 
denotes someone who cannot know for certain that God does not exist but 
thinks it improbable and lives his life on the assumption that he is not there. 
Dawkins explains that he only included category 7 for symmetry with 
category 1 which he contends is far more populated than the former. So 
already he is conceding the possibility of the existence of God. 
 
He continues that it is in the ‘nature of faith that one is capable, like Jung, of 
holding a belief without adequate reason to do so’. Dawkins also mocks Jung 
for believing that ‘particular books on his shelf exploded with a loud bang’. 
Dawkins asserts that ‘atheists do not have faith; and reason alone could not 
propel one to total conviction that anything definitely does not exist’. He 
further explains that although he puts himself in category 6 on this basis, he 
still leans toward 7 because he is ‘agnostic’ only to the extent that he is 
agnostic about fairies at the bottom of the garden.  
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Dawkins’ interpretation of Jung here needs to be questioned. For Jung, 
religion must be treated seriously because it is ‘incontestably one of the 
earliest and most universal expressions of the human mind’ (Jung, 1958, 5). In 
relation to God, Jung does not know that God exists but rather, from his 
psychological approach, takes seriously that the idea of God exists in terms of 
the ‘primitive unconscious psyche’ (Jung, 1995, 381). Whereas the assumption, 
for example, that ‘man was created on the sixth day of Creation’ can be seen 
as ‘too simple and archaic to satisfy us nowadays’, this is not true in relation 
to the psyche that has an ‘anatomical pre-history of millions of years’. Jung 
even asserts that this is why believers have declared him an ‘atheist’ despite 
his embracing of the psychological understanding of the existence of God.  
 
To explain this further, Jung discusses the virgin birth which he says is 
understood within psychology not in terms of whether it is true or not but 
with the fact that such an idea exists (Jung, 1958, 6). Consequently, 
‘psychological existence is subjective in so far as an idea occurs in only one 
individual. But it is objective in so far as it is shared by a society – by a 
consensus gentium’. Jung even makes the comparison here with natural science 
in that psychology deals with ideas and mental contents just as zoology deals 
with different species of animals (Jung, 1958, 6-7). For Jung, an elephant is as 
‘true’ a phenomenon as is the existence of ideas that penetrate the psyche and 
our consciousness as is the case with religion (Jung, 1958, 7). Jung argues that 
religion is a ‘peculiar attitude of mind’ that engages in ‘careful consideration 
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and observation of certain dynamic factors that are conceived as “powers”’ 
(Jung, 1958, 8). These are ‘spirits, daemons, gods, laws, ideas, ideals’, that 
people have taken on to be considered carefully and or ‘grand, beautiful, and 
meaningful enough to be devoutly worshipped and loved’. Ironically, Jung 
states that in colloquial language a person who is obsessed by a particular 
pursuit is ‘“religiously devoted”’ to the relevant cause and such an epithet 
can be applied to scientists who have no creed but who still have a devout 
temper, as in the case of Dawkins.  
 
In relation to faith and reason, Jung notes how historically, in terms of 
nineteenth-century education, the ‘Church’ told young people about the value 
of blind faith and the universities propagated an ‘intellectual rationalism’ 
(Jung, 1958, 343). Jung notes how people in modernity have become tired of 
these ‘warfare of opinions’ and want to find out for themselves ‘how things 
are’. In doing so, this ‘desire opens the door to the most dangerous 
possibilities’ that should be seen as ‘courageous’ and worthy of sympathy. 
Jung sees this as being invoked by a ‘deep spiritual distress to bring meaning 
once more into life on the basis of fresh and unprejudiced experience’. Jung 
realises that we need to be cautious in doing so but we need to support those 
who wish to challenge their own personality. Opposition to such a venture is 
simply supressing what is best in people, their ‘daring’ and their ‘aspirations’ 
and would inhibit that which is an ‘invaluable experience’ that can give 
‘meaning to life’. Jung argues that the psychotherapist must tackle this 
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question and decide whether or not to stand with a human being however it 
might seem they are embarked on some misadventure. The psychotherapist 
must not prejudge what is right or wrong because that will undermine the 
‘richness of experience’. Instead, the focus should be on ‘what actually 
happens – for only that which acts is actual’. Jung’s openness is affirmed by 
the fact that even when it appears some error is self-evident, the error should 
still be explored because in it lies power and life which is lost if the 
psychotherapist holds on to what appears to be true. As Jung elaborates, ‘light 
has need of darkness – otherwise how could it appear to be light?’  
 
There is therefore a greater richness in Jung’s understanding of religion and 
the existence of God than Dawkins allows for in his own caricature of that 
position. Whether Dawkins will allow himself to be open to such a 
conversation given his ‘aggressive atheism’ is doubtful but as Taylor indicates 
it is crucial in creating a decent society that such a dialogue takes place and I 
now want to examine his attempt to do so.  
 
Taylor considers Dawkins’ reasons for arguing that science makes religion 
redundant and suggests that they ‘hardly inspire confidence’ (Taylor, 2007, 
835n27, referring to Dawkins’ quotes in McGrath, 2004, 95). Taylor reports 
how Dawkins contends that faith, defined as ‘“belief that isn’t based on 
evidence”’, is ‘“one of the world’s great evils, comparable to the smallpox 
virus but harder to eradicate”’ (McGrath, 20004, 95).  In contrast, Dawkins 
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sees science as being free from faith but as Taylor correctly indicates the idea 
that there are ‘no assumptions in a scientist’s work which aren’t already based 
on evidence’ is nothing more than ‘blind faith’ without the ‘occasional tremor 
of doubt’ (Taylor, 2007, 835n27). As Taylor notes, ‘few religious believers are 
this untroubled’.  
 
Taylor considers further what is at stake when someone such as Dawkins 
argues that ‘Science has refuted God’ (Taylor, 2007, 567).  For atheists and 
materialists such as Dawkins these arguments are ‘irrefutable’ and are based 
on ‘reason’. Yet Taylor conjectures that the opposite of this, ‘bad reason’, must 
also be accounted for and especially in terms of why it works in terms of 
believing in God. The answer is that science may have tried to show that the 
material world denies the existence of God but Taylor still has his own 
religious life, a sense of God and how he impinges on Taylor’s own existence, 
against all of which he can assess the claims to refutation. Moreover, we also 
need to explain why we do what we do not simply in terms of the information 
from external sources but also from internal ones and this is a story that 
cannot be heard because of the ‘power’ of ‘“atheist humanism”, or exclusive 
humanism’ (Taylor, 2007, 568-9). Dawkins cannot allow himself to be open to 
this but unless he does he simply falls back onto the type of faith in science 
that he imputes in a derisory manner to faith in religion.  
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Taylor attempts his own dialogue with Dawkins by referring to a ‘moving 
obituary’ that the latter wrote for his colleague, mentor and fellow atheist 
William Hamilton who expressed his desire to have his body laid out in the 
Amazon jungle and ‘“interred by burying beetles as food for their larvae”’ 
(Taylor, 2007, 606; Dawkins, 2000, 12). Hamilton imagines that later his flesh 
will have nourished the new-born beetles allowing him to escape and fly out 
‘“into the Brazilian wilderness beneath the stars”’. Taylor suggests that this 
‘sense of wonder, and piety of belonging’ can be seen as both ‘compatible’ 
and an ‘intrinsic’ aspect of a ‘naturalist, immanentist’ and ‘materialist’ 
perspective and that is no doubt how Dawkins would interpret it (Taylor, 
2007, 606-7). However, Taylor then proposes that the ‘power’ of this 
experience might include ‘something similar, perhaps even richer’ that ‘might 
be recovered in the register of religious belief’ (Taylor, 2007, 607). Moreover, 
he suggests that there are also ‘modes of aesthetic experience’ that have an 
‘epiphanic, transcendent reference’ as is the case with Bede Griffiths or works 
of art. Taylor concludes that the challenge to the ‘unbeliever’, such as 
Dawkins, is to ‘find a non-theistic register’ to respond to these experiences 
‘without impoverishment’. He admits that it is arguable whether these 
registers can be found or arbitrated inter-subjectively even though we all have 
a reading of these experiences that give us our own response to them. It is 
also difficult because we can give an order to things without stating on what 
basis our ontological commitment to them is meant to be. Taylor cites as 
examples the way Wordsworth’s poetry could be revered ‘across an 
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ontological spectrum ranging from orthodox Christians to atheists, including 
Eliot and Hardy’. Indeed, Taylor finds it interesting that Dawkins’ mentor 
Hamilton, ‘a major articulator of contemporary unbelief, faced with the 
accusation that his age and milieu are lacking depth, points to its love of 
Hardy and Housman’. Again, though, Taylor states that he is not claiming to 
decide the issue here, but is rather exposing the ‘considerations which weigh 
with each one of us, as we find ourselves leaning one way or another’ in our 
desire for ‘fullness’.  
 
Taylor, though, also needs to be careful. The conversation he is having with 
Dawkins is a good one and pushes the boundaries where theism and atheism 
meet. The key is Taylor’s use of the phrase ‘perhaps even richer’ for a theistic 
understanding of Hamilton’s desire to live on as a beetle. Just as Hamilton 
and Dawkins want this to remain in the immanent materialist frame, Taylor 
wants to push it into the theist camp but there really is no need to do this 
from a Jungian perspective. Both are equally valid ways of understating the 
aspiration to fullness even in death and show how the theist and atheist 
divide can come into contact with each other. From a Jungian perspective, 
neither of these accounts are a form of ‘impoverishment’ either but rich in the 
wonders of life and our attitude to death and the possibility of transcendence.  
 
Conclusion 
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This critical exploration of Taylor’s endorsement of Epstein’s ‘minimal 
religion’ has raised a number of important issues in relation to Taylor’s 
thought. In the first instance the attempt to elide the thought of Freud and 
Jung by Epstein has been shown to be untenable. Jung rejected Freud’s 
theories for their reductionism and superficial understanding of the power of 
religious thought. Taylor accepts the importance of Freud’s theories, but also 
rejects them for their reductionism and for the fact that they had only a 
limited understanding of fullness that remained within the realm of 
immanence and did not engage with the transcendent moment without. To 
elucidate this important movement from within/without and immanence to 
transcendence I drew on the theories of Jung, who Taylor does not mention, 
even though Epstein does, but with scant justice to the richness of his work in 
this area. A more developed understanding of Jung’s discussion on religion 
and the theory of consciousness has thus been shown to be both a fruitful 
source to articulate an important aspect of Taylor’s religious vision that also 
opens up the possibility of a dialogue between his theism and a more 
nuanced humanism. To try to show what this dialogue might look like, I 
examined the conversion of St. Paul and attempted to create a conversation 
with the ‘aggressive atheism’ of Dawkins. In both examples, the richness of 
the Jungian framework to complement Taylor’s minimal religion approach 
showed how the boundaries between theism and atheism might touch 
tangentially on the path to fullness and the creation of a decent society.  
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